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I'NTRODUCTION 
A new view of rural financial markets and their relationship to 
rural development has emerged in the past few years. This view has emerged 
because of an analysis of the generally disappointing results obtained from 
the several agricultural credit policies and programs implemented in develop-
ing countries during the past couple of decades. The purpose of this paper 
is to present a concise outline of the key elements of the analysis that 
underlies the new ideas. In the short-time available for this session, only 
a brief outline is possible. Readers interested in pursuing the matter 
further can find an excellent summary of the literature in a paper by Adams 
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and Graham.- A more detailed and comprehensive treatment is found in the 
several papers presented in the 1981 Colloquium on Rural Finance cosponsored 
by the World Bank and AID. 
Many of the new ideas developed regarding rural financial markets 
can be traced to over a dozen years of research by faculty and students at 
the Ohio State University working with several collaborating researchers in 
the U.S. and abroad. AID played an important role through the financing of 
some of the research, consultancies, training, conferences, and information 
dissemination activities~/ 
The first section of this paper sunnnarizes some of the common 
assumptions held ab0ut agricultural credit. The second section describes 
a number of credit policies and programs that are frequently found in 
!/ Adams, D.W. and Douglas H. Graham, "A Critique of Traditional 
Agricultural Credit Projects and Policies," Journal of Development 
E~onomics, Vol. 8, 1981, pp. 347-366 
'!:_/ Although AID support is gratefully acknowledged, the conclusions of 
this work do not necessarily reflect the views of AID. 
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developing countries. Thirdly, the results of these policies and programs 
are described. The final section summarizes some of the new views of rural 
financial markets which are aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of past 
efforts. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Although the details of the objectives and operations of 
agricultural credit policies and programs vary from country to country, 
the broad outlines are fairly standard. This similarity is due to the 
common assumptions or "truths" held by planners and policy makers, many of 
which have been formulated without formal testing or empirical verification. 
1. Farmer behavior. Traditional farmers are reluctant to adopt 
new inputs and technology so they must be bribed with cheap credit. Since 
they are likely to squander it, they must be given credit in kind and/or be 
closely supervised. Farmers face essentially the same seasonal pattern of 
cash flow so the timing of their household cash surpluses and deficits 
coincide. Furthermore, farmers in low income countries are too poor to 
save. For these two reasons, there is little scope for f iriancial inter-
mediation in rural areas. Cheap credit must be supplied from outside. 
2. Lender behavior. In the absence of formal credit, farmers 
borrow from informal sources. These sources are dominated by rapacious 
moneylenders who systematically charge usurious interest rates, and use 
every opportunity to steal the unwitting farmers' land and possessions. 
Agricultural credit programs should seek to at least provide competition 
to the moneylenders, and better yet drive them completely out of business. 
Formal lenders are too risk averse to lend to agriculture, but they can 
be coerced by government regulations to forego their normal criteria for 
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resource allocation in order to service agriculture. Nationalized lenders 
are even more prone to forget profit and loss considerations to follow govern-
ment objectives. 
3. Financial markets. Credit is an essential input into the produc-
tion process like seeds and fertilizer. If it is lacking, the entire package 
fails. It can be directed and controlled for specific purposes like other 
inputs. Therefore, credit planning can be an effective complement or even 
substitute for production planning. Opening and closing the credit spigot or 
redirecting the flow will cause production and income to rise and fall in 
response. Quotas, targets and other measures are efficient ways of allocating 
loans. Cheap credit can also meet other social objectives such as offsetting 
the disincentives of cheap food prices or improving the income distribution of 
the rural poor. 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
Planners usually have two general objectives for agricultural credit: 
increase the total supply and reduce the cost. A further objective in many 
countries is to help the rural poor by reducing the cost of loans to small 
farmers below the rates charged other farmers. The follQwing policies and 
programs characterize the efforts of many countries. It is also frequently 
the case that the credit system becomes increasingly complex because of 
"re-regulation": adding new rules and institutions over time to compensate 
for past failures to meet objectives. 
1. Incentives and regulations. Special funds, complex rediscounting 
and reserve arrangements, loan guarantees and other incentives are used to 
encourage lenders to increase credit flows. Quotas, penalties, bank licensing 
rules, and political suasion are used for the same purpose. 
.. I· 
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2. Targeting. Loan targets and guidelines are developed to 
specify who should get credit, in what amount for which purpose. 
3. Pricing. Interest rates on loans are set at low and 
inflexible levels. Rates paid on savings necessarily must be set even 
lower. With high and variable inflation rates, lending and savings rates 
are often negative in real terms. 
4. Source of funds. Little attempt is made to encourage savings 
mobilization. Many agricultural lenders are even prevented from providing 
deposit and savings services. Most loan funds come from government, 
central banks or donors. 
5. Institutions. New specialized institutions like agricultural 
banks, development banks and cooperatives are created when existing 
lenders fail to meet desired credit goals. Expensive supervised credit 
programs are introduced to monitor end use of borrowed funds. 
RESULT 
Some analysts argue that most agricultural credit programs are a 
failure. Others who are more hopeful admit major shortcomings. The follow-
ing observations about key performance measures sunnnarize the situation in 
many countries. 
1. Supply of formal credit. The nominal value of agricultural 
credit frequently rises for a time following the introduction of a new 
policy or program. But the real value of credit has shown only modest 
increase and has declined in many cases during periods of high inflation. 
Some redefinition of loans occurs so the apparent increase in credit is 
.· 
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partly illusionary. Donor funds simply substitute for own funds in many 
countries. The ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural production 
and the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural credit often do not 
substantially change. 
2. Credit distribution. Most loans lend to be short-term and 
collateral continues to be a major loan requirement~· .The share of credit 
to small farmers rises very slowly, if at all. Small farmer credit targets 
are met by making multiple small loans to large farmers. 
3. Informal credit. Informal credit continues to be important. 
Many farmers borrow both formal and informal credit, but repay the informal 
source first because that credit is more valuable. A borrower cannot afford 
to jeopardize the source of credit that is most reliable, lends quickly with 
" 
low borrowing costs, and provides credit when urgently needed for consump-
tion, weddings and emergencies. 
4. Cost of credit. Low interest rates result in excess demand 
for credit. Since rates are controlled, other methods must be used by 
lenders to ration supplies. These methods raise total borrowing costs much 
higher than the nominal interest rates. There are few incentives for lenders 
to be innovative, to reduce costs and to improve service. Many innovations 
in fact are designed to evade rules and result in increased costs. Excess 
demand also breeds corruption as it provides great opportunities for low 
paid bank officials to "sell" loans. 
5. Loan repayment. Repayment performance is poor in most programs. 
It is not uncommon for overdues to exceed 50 percent of loans outstanding. 
Since the emphasis is on "pushing out the money" (often as part of a poli-
tical promise) and funds become quickly labelled as government money, it is 
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difficult to introduce effective sanctions for non-repayment. A borrower 
who "bought" his loan is less likely to feel compelled to repay it. 
6. Additionality. It is difficult to clearly assess the real 
impact of loans made. The additionality expected in, say, use of new input~ 
or expanded production is frequently diluted because of fungibility. Loan 
funds may simply substitute for own funds or may be diverted to other uses. 
Resources are wasted by both lenders and borrowers as one tries to supervise 
loan use and the other works to cover up the true use. 
7. Institutional viability. Most agricultural credit institutions 
are not financially viable. Margins do not cover high operating costs and 
low repayment means that fresh injections of funds from governments or donors 
are required. When priorities shift elsewhere and these funds dry up, the 
real value of new loans made spirals downward. When the institution is finan-
cially ruined, a new institution is frequently created to absorb and/or 
replace it, and the cycle starts over again with fresh funds. Savings mobili-
zation is not an objective, so the institutions continue to be dependent on 
the government and subject to its whims and fads for its funds. 
8. Rural financial markets. The growth of integrated and efficient 
rural financial markets is retarded. Safe and reliable deposit and savings 
services are not provided in many areas. Special programs and institutions, 
each with their own objectives, fragment rather than integrate the market. 
The precedent established by permitting non-repayment of loans sets back the 
development of self-sustaining institutions for years. The merry-go-round 
of funds continues: private institutions channel a river of funds from rural 
to urban areas while governments try to push a trickle back. 
.· 
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KEY ELEMENTS OF A NEW STRATEGY 
The new views about rural financial markets challenge a number of 
the assumptions and policies that are part of past agricultural credit 
projects in developing countries. Experience gained from past projects 
suggest a number of key elements of a new general strategy for rural f inan-
cial markets. The specific strategy for any particular country or project 
must, of course, be adjusted to the specifics of the local situation. 
1. Interest.rates. The foundation of any general strategy is 
flexible interest rates. Just as product prices must adjust to changing 
conditions of the market, so must the cost and return for money. An important 
factor affecting the adjustment of interest rates is inflation. Year-to-year 
variability in inflation rates requires that the nominal rates on loans and 
deposits be adjusted in a compensating fashion so that positive real interest 
rates are achieved. Savers cannot be expected to save over a long_period 
of time if real savings rates are negative. Likewise, interest rates cannot 
effectively allocate loans if they are negative in real terms. 
2. Savings mobilization. Flexible interest rates provide the basic 
condition for savings mobilization. More efforts should be placed on savings 
mobilization activities because all rural people need to save in some form 
but not everyone demands loans. The benefits of the many having a safe and 
convenient way to save may outweigh the benefits of a few getting subsidized 
loans. Few countries have aggressively engaged in innovative rural savings 
mobilization activities. Yet countries as divereeas Taiwan, Korea, Kenya, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Sudan, the Punjab of India, and Zambia have reported 
substantial voluntary savings capacity. Recent AID funded projects in Peru 
and Bangladesh reported positive results from aggressive savings mobilization 
• 
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campaigns. Additional benefits from savings mobilization include the 
independence that institutions obtain by not having to continually rely 
on government or donor funds. If cooperatives were able to provide 
attractive savings facilities, it would give their members stronger reasons 
to be more active. 
3. Innovations. Current policies try to force lenders to provide 
subsidized credit to farmers. Some of the subsidy can be better spent on 
financing the learning costs of lenders so they can experiment and more 
quickly find an appropriate method for use in lending to farmers on a sound 
cormnercial basis. The difficulty of lending to farmers in a risky developing 
country economic environment should not be under-estimated. Widespread 
experimentation is required to identify the method and system appropriate 
to each situation. 
4. Non-farm Enterprises. Recent studies by the World Bank document 
the great importance of small-scale industries in rural areas. AID funded 
studies by Carl Liedholm and colleagues at Michigan State University 
in Bangladesh, Jamaica, Honduras, Egypt and Thailand reveal that these 
firms are seriously under-reported in government statistics. Studies 
have also shown the great importance of non-farm enterprises and off-
farm work for rural households. Results of a recent AID project with 
Kasetsart University, Michigan State, and Ohio State in Thailand show 
that these two sources provide more than half the total household income 
for a large proportion of Thai rural households. Surprisingly, small-scale 
rural enterprises and non-farm enterprises of rural households are largely 
over looked in rural credit programs. The Rural Finance Experimental Project 
in Bangladesh revealed a heavy demand for credit for non-farm activities 
at nominal interest rates of 30 and 36 percent. Efforts are needed to 
.. 
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demonstrate the importance of these activities in rural areas and 
encourage lenders to try to serve the deposit and lending needs of these 
types of enterprises. In some countries, specialized agricultural lenders 
are prohibited from lending to them. 
5. Institutions. The emphasis should be directed away from 
developing specialized institutions and directed toward assisting existing 
institutions to offer a wider range of financial services. Institutions 
need to be opened up to a wider range of credit - short-term, long-term, 
farm enterprise, non-farm enterprise, etc. This permits them to spread 
their risks, and also provide a broader range of integrated services to 
customers. Incentives need to be provided to encourage rural institutions 
to offer deposit and savings services in addition to making loans. 
Nationalizing banks does not seem to have been a very successful way to get 
them to adopt a more socially productive role than private banks, at least 
with respect to agricultural lending. 
6. Credit as liquidity. Policy makers should stop viewing credit 
as an input like seed and fertilizer. Rather it needs to be viewe~ as it 
is - claim over resources that can be acquired with the liquidity provided 
by a loan. The great value of money is its fungibility. Restrictions on 
credit reduce its fungibility and therefore, reduce its value.~· Instead 
of trying to direct and control the use of funds for specific purpose..q 
incentives should be provided so borrowers use it in socially desirable 
ways. If farmers hesitate to buy fertilizer with credit, the underlying 
reason should be studied rather than try to force them to use credit for 
that purpose. 
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THE ROLE OF DONOR AGENCIES 
Donors can play an important role in developing and refining these 
new views, and adapting them to local circumstances. Donors first must 
recognize their role in contributing to market fragmentation by financing 
projects with the objective of channeling subsidized credit to specific 
target groups for specific purposes. They must move away from narrow 
projects to a broader systems approach to financial markets. The leverage 
obtained through loans and grants must be directed toward systemwide 
reforms rather than providing maximum impact for a select few. The financial 
system needs to be opened up to provide a broader range of services, and in 
many cases this requires adjustment of basic policies and procedures. 
Special attention should be directed towards the needs of rural non-farm 
enterprises, difficult as this will be, and the efforts of the AID Missions 
• in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Bangladesh in this area are 
' 
to be applauded. These efforts are important for two reasons. First, 
non-farm enterprises will likely be relatively more important for the rural 
landless, and for rainfed farmers who have less opportunity to intensify 
farming. Secondly, these experiments will help clarify how the needs of 
this difficult sector can be met. 
Donors can also help develop more reasonable expectations about rural 
finance. They can help develop clearer understanding of the great difficulty 
in providing self-sustaining deposit and lending services to poor people 
in uncertain environments; in the limitations of providing subsidized credit 
to the few while discriminating against the many through price, foreign 
exchange, trade and other controls; and by recognizing the impossibility 
of improving rural income distributions through cheap credit • 
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A couple of decades ago, financial markets were given increased 
emphasis because of the new idea then of supply-led development. This 
idea was strengthened by agricultural planners who simplistically linked 
credit with production. Our views are now maturing as we increasingly 
recognize the complexity of developing financial markets. Credit to 
agriculture does not provide a shortcut to avoid the difficult, fundamental 
problems faced by the sector. Agricultural input supplies, research to 
develop new teclmology, reforms and improvements in product markets, 
improved infrastructure - these remain as the top priority issues. In 
many cases, it will be necessary to remove the obstacles that rural finan-
cial markets present in making greater progress on these issues • 
